Monday, November 16, 2026
Who's Who in the EUDI Wallet Ecosystem: Actors and Entities Explained
Why does a wallet need so many actors?
When people hear about the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet, EUDIW), they usually picture an app on their phone. The app is only the visible part.
Behind every "Login with EUDI", every digital diploma and every qualified signature stands a network of organisations. Some issue data, some rely on it, some vouch for others, and some supervise the whole system.
The reason is trust. A bank that receives Person Identification Data (PID) from a wallet needs to know that the data comes from a real government source, has not been altered, is still valid, and sits in a genuine wallet. The user, in turn, needs to know that the bank is who it claims to be and asks only for what it is allowed to ask for.
eIDAS 2.0 and the Architecture and Reference Framework (ARF) define these roles. The latest ARF, version 3.0 from July 2026, lists close to twenty of them. In this post, we group them into five layers:
- The wallet: users, wallet providers and device manufacturers
- Attestation providers (issuers): the organisations that put data into the wallet
- Relying parties (verifiers): the services that request data from the wallet
- Trust infrastructure: registrars, certificate authorities and trusted lists
- Governance: the bodies that certify, accredit and supervise
One organisation can hold several roles at once, as long as it meets the requirements of each. A Member State can, for example, be both the wallet provider and the PID provider.
Who holds and provides the wallet?
At the centre of the ecosystem are the person and the wallet on their phone:
- Users receive, store and present their PID and other attestations, create qualified electronic signatures (QES), and use pseudonyms where identification is not needed. Using the wallet is voluntary, so services must stay accessible by other means as well.
- Wallet providers make a certified wallet available to users. A wallet provider is a Member State itself, or an organisation mandated or recognised by a Member State. Every Member State must offer at least one wallet by 24 December 2026 (however, the rollout is expected to happen throughout 2027). The wallet provider signs attestations that prove the app is genuine and that its keys are protected by secure hardware, and it may not collect usage data beyond what is strictly necessary.
- Device manufacturers and related subsystem providers supply the phone, the operating system, secure cryptographic hardware and app stores. They are not wallet providers, but the wallet relies on their platform to reach the security level required for PID (Level of Assurance high).
Who issues the data in the wallet?
A wallet is empty until someone issues data into it. The organisations that do this are called attestation providers (issuers). Both terms mean the same thing and are used interchangeably. eIDAS 2.0 separates them by the legal weight of what they issue:
- PID providers verify a person's identity at Level of Assurance high and issue the PID: name, date of birth, nationality and other core identity attributes. They also publish the status information relying parties need to check that a PID is still valid. In practice, these are often the same bodies that issue national identity cards today. Their content and format are set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2977.
- QEAA providers issue qualified electronic attestations of attributes (QEAA), such as a diploma or a professional licence. Only a qualified trust service provider (QTSP) can issue a QEAA. A QEAA has the same legal effect as a lawfully issued paper document.
- PuB-EAA providers are public sector bodies responsible for an authentic source, such as a business register, issuing attestations from that source. They are not QTSPs, but their attestations also have the same legal effect as paper and are recognised in all Member States.
- EAA providers issue non-qualified electronic attestations of attributes: employee badges, membership cards, tickets, insurance cards and similar. An EAA can be used as evidence like any other document, but unlike a QEAA, it does not automatically count as the equivalent of a paper attestation.
- Authentic sources are registers recognised by law as the primary source of an attribute, for example the land register or a register of education records. When a QEAA provider needs to confirm an attribute, such as an address, an age, a qualification or a company detail, it can check it directly against the authentic source. Some authentic sources also issue attestations themselves, as PuB-EAA providers.
- Attestation scheme providers define what an attestation means and how it is encoded. Each scheme comes as a human-readable rulebook and a machine-readable schema. The European Commission publishes the PID rulebook and runs a catalogue of schemes so that everyone requests and reads attributes in the same way.
For example, an insurance card issued by an insurer is an EAA, an extract issued by the business register itself is a PuB-EAA, and a diploma or professional licence issued through a QTSP is a QEAA.
A trust service provider (TSP) is any organisation that provides one of the trust services listed in eIDAS 2.0, such as electronic signatures, seals, timestamps or the issuance of attestations of attributes. Since issuing an EAA is itself a trust service, EAA providers are TSPs, unless their attestations are used only within a closed system. A qualified TSP (QTSP) must also pass a conformity assessment, be granted qualified status and appear on the national trusted list, after which it is audited at least every 24 months. In return, what it issues, such as a QEAA, carries stronger legal presumptions.
Who relies on the data?
On the other side of the wallet are the services that ask for data. They are called relying parties (verifiers). Both terms mean the same thing and are used interchangeably.
- Relying parties are service providers that request attributes from a wallet, always with the user's approval. Before they can do so, they must register in the Member State where they are established and declare each intended use and the attributes it needs. They may not request anything beyond what they registered, must identify themselves to the user, and are responsible for validating the PID and attestations they receive.
- Relying party services and instances are how the ARF handles larger organisations. A bank can register several services with different intended uses, such as onboarding and payments, and each technical system that talks to wallets gets its own access certificate.
- Intermediaries connect to wallets on behalf of relying parties and pass the verified data on to them. eIDAS 2.0 says that intermediaries "shall be deemed to be relying parties and shall not store data about the content of the transaction". The amended registration rules let the intermediary hold the access certificate, with a registered link to each relying party it serves, so the wallet can still show the user who actually receives the data.
From 24 December 2027, many relying parties will have to accept the wallet. This applies to private companies that must use strong user authentication by law or contract (except micro and small enterprises) in sectors such as banking, financial services, insurance, transport, energy, health, telecoms and education. It also applies to very large online platforms, while public bodies that require online identification must accept wallets as soon as they are available.
Who makes the trust machinery work?
Wallets, attestation providers and relying parties never meet in person, so they need a shared way to check each other. This is the job of the trust infrastructure, set out mainly in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/848 and its 2026 amendment, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1730:
- Registrars maintain national registers of relying parties and attestation providers. They verify identity and other required registration information and publish registration data in human- and machine-readable form. The 2026 amendment explicitly requires them to record declared intended uses and requested attributes for transparency, without pre-authorising them. They may suspend or cancel a registration if a relying party requests more attributes than it registered.
- Access certificate authorities issue X.509 access certificates to registered relying parties and attestation providers. Wallets validate these certificates and the associated authentication proofs when handling requests to share attributes or issue credentials, allowing them to authenticate the party they are interacting with.
- Providers of registration certificates issue signed records of a relying party's declared intended use, the attributes it registered its intention to request, and a link to the applicable privacy policy. Wallets compare requests against these records and warn users when a request exceeds the registered scope. Registration itself does not grant legal permission to collect the data.
- Trusted list and LoTE providers publish information used to establish trust in ecosystem participants. Each Member State signs and publishes a national trusted list identifying its QTSPs, their qualified services and their status. The Commission's EU List of Trusted Lists links to and enables authentication of those national lists. The Commission also signs and publishes Lists of Trusted Entities (LoTEs) for wallet providers, PID providers, PuB-EAA providers, access certificate authorities and providers of registration certificates, based on Member State notifications. Relying parties appear in national registers rather than an EU Trusted List or LoTE. Wallets authenticate them using access certificates.
- Qualified electronic signature remote creation (QESRC) providers are QTSPs that manage remote qualified signature or seal creation devices, allowing wallets to create qualified electronic signatures and seals. eIDAS requires wallets to offer natural persons qualified electronic signing by default and free of charge. Member States may limit that free use to non-professional purposes.
Which certificate authority is which?
"Certificate authority" covers more than one role in this ecosystem:
- Access certificate authorities authenticate relying parties and attestation providers to wallets.
- Providers of registration certificates state what a registered party is allowed to do.
- QTSPs acting as certificate authorities issue qualified certificates for electronic signatures, seals and website authentication, as they did under the original eIDAS.
The first two are notified by Member States and listed on a LoTE. The third is listed on the national trusted list.
Who watches over the system?
The last layer does not take part in transactions, but it decides who is allowed to:
- Supervisory bodies are designated by each Member State. One supervises the wallet framework, and one supervises trust services. QTSPs are supervised before and after they start operating, while non-qualified TSPs are supervised after the fact, when there is a reason to look.
- Conformity assessment bodies (CABs) certify wallets before they reach users, with certification valid for up to five years, and audit QTSPs at least every 24 months.
- National accreditation bodies accredit the CABs and monitor them, so that certifications can be trusted across borders.
- Data protection authorities enforce the GDPR. With the wallet, users can report a relying party to them directly.
- The European Commission adopts the implementing acts, maintains the ARF together with Member States, publishes the LoTEs, the List of Trusted Lists and the list of certified wallets, and runs the catalogue of attestation schemes.
What does this look like in Slovenia?
Many of these roles already have a name in Slovenia, while others are still being set up. As of November 2026:
- Wallet provider: the national wallet, eDenarnica, is being built on the eOsebna app by the Ministry of the Interior and Public Administration (MNZJU). At the ZEIDES 2026 conference, the ministry announced a sandbox for service providers in the first quarter of 2027, pre-production testing in the second quarter, and a certified wallet going live on 1 July 2027, about six months after the EU deadline.
- Registrar: the national implementing regulation adopted in May 2026 assigns the register of relying parties, and the mechanism for authenticating them, to MNZJU.
- Authentic source for PID: the Central Population Register, also held by MNZJU.
- Supervisory body for trust services and eID: the Information Society Inspectorate (IRSID), which also maintains the Slovenian trusted list.
- QTSPs: the state's SI-TRUST, as well as private providers such as Halcom and Rekono.
- Accreditation body: Slovenian Accreditation (Slovenska akreditacija) accredits the conformity assessment bodies.
- Data protection authority: the Information Commissioner (Informacijski pooblaščenec).
Where does LutraID fit?
For most organisations, the question is not which of these roles to take on, but how to connect to them:
- For relying parties (verifiers), LutraID works in two ways. With the hosted (SaaS) service, LutraID is your intermediary: it connects to wallets on your behalf under its own access certificate, validates the PID and attestations it receives, and forwards the result to your systems without keeping it. With a self-hosted installation, your organisation talks to the wallet directly, under its own access certificate, and is the relying party itself.
- For attestation providers (issuers), LutraID provides the infrastructure to issue EAA and other credentials to EUDI Wallets in your own name, under your own registration.
- For signing, LutraID lets you request qualified electronic signatures from users through their wallet.
You can read more about the two modes in our documentation on Direct vs Intermediary mode.
Understanding who does what is the first step towards being ready for the EUDI Wallet. If you want to see how these roles come together in your own processes, we are happy to walk you through it.
Want to see this running on your own flows?
Book a demo and we will walk through issuing and verifying credentials against the processes your team actually runs today.
